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FIVE YEARS UNDER THE VETERANS'
JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT: THE VA IS
BROUGHT KICKING AND SCREAMING
INTO THE WORLD OF MEANINGFUL DUE
PROCESS
Lawrence B. Hagel and Michael P. Horan'
THE MANY PERSPECTIVES OF THE VETERAN
I have been asked to give you the "veterans' perspective" on
whether the Court of Veterans Appeals has served the purpose for
which it was created by Congress and also to describe what addi-
tional steps the court might take to further the ends desired by vet-
erans. This is no easy task.
It is difficult not because I do not have a lot to say. It is difficult
because it is a charge to speak, in a sense, for all veterans. In order
to understand what I mean, I think it may be helpful to give you a
little background on the view of the veterans community regarding
judicial review.
There are forty veterans service organizations2 recognized- by the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 4 These organizations range
from the smallest, the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, to the
largest, the American Legion, which boasts 3.2 million members.
The Paralyzed Veterans of America, of which I am the General
Counsel, fits somewhere in the middle. In addition, there are other
small organizations of veterans which do not have official VA recog-
nition. In all, these organizations speak for some twenty-seven mil-
lion veterans of the United States Armed Forces.
The number of veterans organizations gives you an idea of the di-
versity of interests of veterans. There is complete unanimity of opin-
ion on few issues affecting the veterans community. Judicial review
1. Lawrence B. Hagel is Deputy General Counsel of Paralyzed Veterans of
America (PVA). Michael P. Horan is Director of Veterans' Appeals Litigation of
PVA.
This Article is based on the remarks of Robert L. Nelson, General Counsel of PVA,
delivered at the University of Maine School of Law on September 24, 1993. Contribu-
tions to this article were made by Fredrick J. E. Mullen, Sr., Director of PVA Appel-
late Services and William Mailander, Esq., Associate Director, PVA Veterans Appeals
Litigation Office.
2. DEPARTMENT OF VERANs AFFAIRS, DIRECTORY OF VETEANs SERVICE ORGANIZA-
TONS (1993).
3. "Recognized" organizations are those approved by the VA to prosecute claims
on behalf of veterans before the Department of Veterans Affairs. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5902
(West 1991).
4. For simplicity the Department of Veterans Affairs will be referred to by its
more widely known acronym, the "VA."
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is an example.
To give you some perspective on my remarks, let me tell you a
little about the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA). PVA's mem-
bership is composed of 16,000 veterans, all of whom have either a
spinal cord injury or disease. We have thirty-six chapters through-
out the United States and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
The national organization employs some 275 individuals. About 185
of those employees, located in 56 service offices, are dedicated to the
direct delivery of services to veterans by assisting them in obtaining
the benefits to which they are entitled. This number includes an of-
fice charged solely with representing veterans at the Board of Veter-
ans' Appeals and one which represents veterans before the Court of
Veterans Appeals. All of our representation is provided free of
charge to veterans and without regard to PVA membership status.
In total, PVA currently holds the power of attorney for approxi-
mately 82,000 veterans and over the past six years has had more
than 10,000 of its cases decided by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.
It has represented nearly 100 appellants before the United States
Court of Veterans Appeals and United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
PRE-JUDICIAL REVIEW VIEWS ON THE VA
ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
For over 170 years prior to the passage of the Veterans' Judicial
Review Act (VJRA) 5 in 1988, it was the view of Congress that there
should be no judicial review of veterans' claims for benefits.0 Addi-
tionally, the Administrative Procedure Act, passed in 1946, effec-
tively exempted the VA from its reach, leading one commentator,
and more recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
to observe that "the Veterans' [sic] Administration stands in
'splendid isolation as the single federal administrative agency whose
major functions are explicitly insulated from judicial review.' "'
Veterans, perceiving injustice and arbitrariness, began to seek a
means of independent review of VA decisions regarding claims for
disability compensation and veterans' pensions. The first Congres-
5. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1989)
(hereinafter VJRA).
6. HR. REP. No. 963, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782
(hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 100-963).
7. Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in Processing of Claims for
Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1975), cited in
H.R. REP. No. 100-963; Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But see Judi-
cial Review of Veterans' Claims Hearings: Before the Subcomm. on Special Investi-
gations for the Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-40 (1980) (testi-
mony of Richard Berg, Executive Secretary, Administrative Conference of the United
States, citing more than 50 current statutes which purport to preclude review of exec-
utive branch decisions).
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sional hearings conducted with a view toward changing this practice
were held in 1952. At those hearings, a pattern began that was to
repeat itself for some thirty-five years. Several veterans organiza-
tions opposed various pending bills while other veterans organiza-
tions, as well as a number of other witnesses (including the Ameri-
can Bar Association), supported various alternatives providing for
outside review of VA decision-making.8 The VA, not surprisingly,
opposed bills that would grant veterans judicial review, extolling the
existing claims system as one that provided a fair and responsive
means of adjudicating the hundreds of thousands of claims for bene-
fits made each year. Indeed, the VA still clings to this view even
today, after the passage of judicial review. Hearings considering va-
rious proposals for judicial review were also conducted in 1960, 1962,
1970, 1980, 1983, and 1986, with similar results.0
Despite the fact that Congress did not initially pass legislation
lifting the ban on judicial review of VA decisions, it did recognize
the complaints voiced by veterans that the process of claims adjudi-
cation was not as "fair and responsive" as the VA would have Con-
gress believe. As a result of these hearings, Congress did pass laws
which strengthened the due process rights of veterans. For example,
Public Law No. 87-9710 required the Board of Veterans' Appeals to
take more care in the analysis and decision of each case that came
before it and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in each
case. Public Law No. 87-86611 required the VA to issue, when re-
quested by a veteran, a written explanation (called a "statement of
the case") of exactly why the veteran's benefit claim was denied.
Public Law No. 85-857 12 established uniform rules for determining
effective dates for allowances, reductions and termination of
benefits.
In 1988 the situation changed somewhat. All veterans service or-
ganizations testifying before Congress favored some form of judicial
review. The organizations, however, were far from unanimous re-
garding what form that review should take.13
8. HR REP. No. 100-963, supra note 6, at 10.
9. Id. at 10-13.
10. Codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (Supp. I1 1991).
11. Codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (Supp. m 1991).
12. Codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (Supp. 11 1991).
13. Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing on S. 11, The Proposed Veterans Ad-
ministration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, and S. 2292, Veter-
ans' Judicial Review Act Before the Comm. on Veterans' Affairs of the United
States Senate, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2841, 49-54, 177-270, 270-311, 383-430 (1988)
(statements of: Thomas J. Burch, National Vietnam Veterans Coalition; Philip
Cushman, Veterans Due Process, Inc.; John F. Heilman, Disabled American Veterans;
Dorothy Legarreta, National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors; Richard E. O'Dell, Viet-
nam Veterans of America; James N. Magill, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United
States; R. Jack Powell, Paralyzed Veterans of America; Philip E. Riggin, The Ameri-
can Legion; Frank E.G. Wel, American Veterans Committee); Judicial Review of
1994]
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DISTINGUISHING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Veterans organizations made a distinction between two types of
judicial review-review of the VA's administrative adjudications of
the claims of veterans for individual benefits and review of the rule-
making authority of the VA and of the VA's interpretation of its
own regulations.
On the former type of judicial review, there was considerable dis-
parity in the views of veterans service organizations. It is clear that
there was concern that with it, judicial review would bring unneces-
sary formalism to the claims adjudication process. On the latter type
of judicial review, however, there was virtual unanimity of opinion
that it was required.
COMMON GROUND FOR VETERANS
While there was diversity of opinion regarding the form of judicial
review, there were a number of common themes that ran through
the testimony of the various veterans groups during the 1988 hear-
ings. They were:
A. The quality of the Board of Veterans' Appeals decisions needed
improvement. Denials of benefits were often based on conclusory
statements without relating those conclusions to facts. This gave the
impression that decisions were arbitrary and capricious.
B. The VA was inflexible in its interpretation of its regulations
and the laws it was charged to administer. There was a suspicion
that these interpretations were often driven, not by legal analysis,
but by fiscal concerns.
C. There was a need for a truly independent decision making au-
thority, standing apart from the VA, with the power to review the
adjudications of the VA.
D. Judicial review and the removal of the fee limitations for attor-
neys might unnecessarily formalize the relatively informal system
for benefits adjudication.
FiVE YEARS AFTER PASSAGE OF THE VJRA: HAVE THE CONCERNS
BEEN MET?
QUALITY OF ADJUDICIATION
Prior to the VJRA and the advent of judicial review, the VA
styled itself as an ex parte, nonadversarial, paternalistic adjudica-
Veterans Affairs: Hearing on H.R. 639, H.R. 5039, S. 11, and S. 2292 Before the
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61-72, 513-28 (1988) (in addition to statements of the organizations
listed before, statements of: Richard W. Johnson, Non-Commissioned Officers Associ-
ation; Noel C. Woosley, American Veterans of World War II, Korea and Vietnam
(AMVETS); Albert J. Bland, Ex-Prisoners of War; Raymond J. Williams, Catholic
War Veterans).
[Vol. 46:43
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tion system. Perhaps it was. However, in characterizing itself in this
manner, the VA adopted adjudication procedures that were com-
pletely alien to black letter law principles governing administrative
law and that were largely incapable of withstanding judicial review
of administrative agency decisions. Indeed, the very reasons why
Congress finally granted veterans the right to judicial review in 1988
were arguments employed by the VA in opposition to judicial
review."
Testifying in opposition to proposed judicial review legislation,
the VA lauded itself for operating an adjudication system that did
not make credibility findings on the evidence filed by a claimant, 9
made its benefit determinations based on the off-the-record medical
judgments of its adjudicators,"6 did not develop evidence to refute a
claimant's contentions, and did not document in the record every
factor upon which it based a denial of a claim for benefits."7 There
was little or no statutory or regulatory authority for these admitted
VA practices.18 Whether previously authorized or not, fortunately
for the veteran, these practices and others are no longer permissible
now that judicial review is a reality.19
Veterans believe that the adjudication practices now guaranteed
the veteran by the Court of Veterans Appeals and imposed on the
VA and Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) by the court's
decisions are neither novel nor judicially created obligations. They
reflect nothing more than the court requiring, as it should, VA and
14. See generally Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
On Veterans' Affairs On S. 11, the Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudication
Procedure and Judicial Review Act, and S. 2292, Veterans' Judicial Review Act, S.
HaG. No. 938, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55, 490-519 (1988) (statements of Donald L
Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans Administration).
15. Id. at 494.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 494-95.
18. See Charles L. Cragin, A Time Of Transition At the Board Of Veterans' Ap-
peals, The Changing Role Of The Physician, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 500 (Nov.IDec.
1991). In this article, the Chairman of the Board of Veterans' Appeals acknowledges
that much of the BVA's adjudication practices before the VJRA seemingly burgeoned
into existence without any apparent statutory or regulatory authority.
19. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the judicial
review process as follows:
In reviewing agency decisions we do examine at least four questions: First,
was the action taken within the agency's powers under its basic statute?
Second, was the procedure followed by the agency correct, that is, was there
administrative due process? Third, was the result reached supported by
substantial evidence? And, fourth, was the rationale by which the agency
reached its result logical, that is, was there a demonstrated logical connec-
tion between the evidence adduced and the conclusion reached by the
agency or was the agency action arbitrary or capricious? These four ques-
tions are at the core of judicial review of administrative agency actions.
Communications Inv. Corp. v. FCC, 641 F.2d 954, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19941
MAINE LAW REVIEW
BVA compliance with statutory law.
The Court of Veterans Appeals in numerous opinions has reversed
the BVA for failing to hold the VA to its statutory duty to assist the
veteran by considering and discussing all potentially applicable and
pertinent statutes and regulations during the adjudication process. 20
The court did not create or impose any unconventional obligations
upon the VA and BVA.21 Indeed, at most, the court was merely forc-
ing compliance by the VA and BVA with the governing statutory
law found throughout Title 38 of the United States Code.2
2
The court, for example, has made it clear that, once notified of the
existence of medical and other records which may assist the veteran
in substantiating a claim for benefits, the VA must make reasonable
efforts to obtain them. The first case to discuss this responsibility,
Jolley v. Derwinski, 3 came to the court after the VA refused Mr.
Jolley's request for assistance in obtaining certain military medical
records he believed would help substantiate his claim. During oral
argument, the VA counsel informed the court that the VA had actu-
ally located the records approximately two months before the hear-
ing but had not informed the veteran of their location. The VA ar-
gued that it had no legal responsibility to obtain these records
because the duty to assist the veteran, embodied in statute" and
20. See Franklin v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1993) ("the BVA and the VA are
not free to ignore the VA's duly promulgated regulations. . ."); Horowitz v. Brown, 5
Vet. App. 217, 223 (1993) (quoting Browder v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 204, 205 (1991))
("[T]he Board 'is required to apply all relevant statutes and regulations appropriate
to the particular case before it.' "); Howard v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 113, 116 (1993)
("[T]he Board is required to consider and discuss the applicability of all potentially
applicable provisions of law."); see also Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 313
(1991); Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118, 120-21 (1991); Fugere v. Derwiski, 1
Vet. App. 103, 108 (1990); Payne v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 85, 87 (1990); Bentley v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 28, 31 (1990).
21. See Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 'fail-
ure to apply the correct legal standards or to provide this court with a sufficient basis
to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for re-
versal.' "); Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993) (court of appeals re-
views the record to determine whether the agency employed the correct legal stan-
dards in evaluating claims); see also Horowitz v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 217, 223 (1993)
(Before the Court of Veterans Appeals, the VA argued, inter alia, that because the
VA rating board had explicitly invoked the provisions of one regulation that this ex-
cused VA noncompliance with another regulation. The court rejected this assertion.).
22. 38 U.S.C. § 511 (Supp. mI 1991) ("The Secretary [of VA] shall decide all
questions of law. . . ."); 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(d)(1)(B) (West 1991) (VA's "statement
of the case shall include . . . [a] citation to pertinent laws and regulations and a
discussion of how such laws and regulations affect the agency's decision."); 38 US.C.
§ 7104(a) (Supp. III 1991) ("Decisions of the [BVA] shall be based on the entire
record ... and upon consideration of ... applicable provisions of law and regula-
tion."); 39 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (Each decision of the [BVA] shall include a written
statement ... on all material issues of ... law presented on the record -. .
23. 1 Vet. App. 37 (1990).
24. "The Secretary shall assist such a claimant in developing the facts pertinent
[Vol. 46:43
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regulation,25 was a mere statement of policy and formed no basis for
a claim that the VA failed to follow binding "procedural rules. 2 0
Subsequent cases have confirmed that the VA's duty to assist the
veteran in developing his or her claim includes: (1) ensuring that the
veteran receives an adequate medical examination when necessary
to determine the existence or degree of a disability;27 (2) making
reasonable efforts to obtain civilian as well as government records;28
and (3) on its own initiative, seeking obviously missing records that
may substantiate or corroborate the veteran's claim.2  Such deci-
sions mean that the veteran's case will be decided on all of the avail-
able, relevant facts.
By enforcing the veteran's statutory right to have the denial of his
claim fully explained,30 the court has forced the BVA to focus on
hard facts, to evaluate opinion evidence, and to explain why it did
not choose to credit evidence that was favorable to the veteran.31
Failure to provide the necessary explanation provides insufficient
basis for judicial review and renders the decision arbitrary and ca-
pricious. This process makes the BVA decide cases based on the rec-
ord rather than on impressions. The result is fairer treatment for
the veteran.
,The court has also searched the law and drawn on provisions
which had gone stale from the VA's lack of usage, to the veteran's
advantage. For example, the court has informed the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs that there is no requirement that a veteran specify
with precision the statutory provisions or the corresponding regula-
tions under which the veteran seeks benefits.3 2 In fact, the court has
found that the combined effect of 38 U.S.C. § 7722(c), requiring the
Secretary to "distribute full information to eligible veterans. . . re-
garding all benefits and services to which they may be entitled
under laws administered by the Department [of Veterans Affairs],"
and the VA's statutory duty to assist the veteran in the develop-
to the claim. Such assistance shall include requesting information as described in sec-
tion 5106 of this title." Section 5106 requires the heads of other executive agencies to
provide information to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 38 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (Supp.
M 1991).
25. "[I]t is the obligation of the VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts
pertinent to the claim and to render a decision which grants every benefit that can be
supported in law while protecting the interests of the Government." 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.103(a) (1993).
26. Jolley v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 39.
27. Perez v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 562, 564 (1992).
28. Collamore v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 541, 543 (1992).
29. Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992).
30. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104(b), 7105(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
31. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 51 (1990) (requiring the Board to make
an analysis of the credibility and probative value of evidence submitted by and on
behalf of the veteran).
32. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 122-23 (1991).
1994]
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ment of facts related to his or her claim"3 require the VA to infer
that a veteran is claiming a benefit when the facts of the claim fairly
present it.3
4
A veteran whose claim has been finally denied always has the
right to reopen the claim if he or she can present "new and mate-
rial" evidence to the VA.35 The court has given this right new life.
Prior VA practice, according to the facts of Manio v. Derwinski,3 0
was to review only the new evidence submitted, in isolation, and to
determine whether or not the new evidence warranted granting the
benefit sought. The VA commonly denied a veteran the right to reo-
pen with a simple statement that the evidence submitted by the vet-
eran did not establish a new factual basis for the claim. In Manio
the court found that once the VA determines that evidence submit-
ted to reopen the claim is "new and material '37 it must reevaluate
the veteran's claim in light of all of the evidence of record, not
merely the new evidence.3 8 This decision means that veterans who
are able to gather new evidence in support of their claim have an
opportunity to have a de novo adjudication under the more
favorable atmosphere of the post-judicial review environment.
The VJRA and the court have also given the veteran a means of
forcing the sometimes intransigent VA to perform tasks it is re-
quired but refuses to perform. The law gives the court the power to
"compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasona-
bly delayed. '3' The court has used this authority, for example, to
order the VA to produce, and to include in an appellant's claims file,
documents which the veteran requested on numerous occasions prior
to the BVA decision.40
There are four volumes of the Veterans Appeals Reporter filled
with other examples. In short, as a result of judicial review, veterans
generally are now receiving more thorough and fairer treatment
when they appeal their claims to the BVA. With some difficulty, the
Board is altering its procedures and its general attitude to accom-
modate the fact that it is no longer the ultimate authority on the
33. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (Supp. III 1991).
34. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 122-23.
35. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (Supp. 1991) ("If new and material evidence is presented or
secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen
the claim and review the former disposition of the claim.").
36. 1 Vet. App. 140 (1991).
37. The phrase "new and material evidence" has been defined by the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs as "evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers
which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration,
which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in connection with
evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to
fairly decide the merits of the claim." 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (Supp. III 1991).
38. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 145.
39. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
40. Koulizos v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 350, 351 (1992).
[Vol. 46:43
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application of facts and law to a veteran's claim. Most importantly,
if the BVA denies a claim, it must thoroughly explain its reasons to
the veteran, and this explanation must be supported by evidence of
record and by reasoning that will withstand the scrutiny of review
by a non-VA, judicial body.
THE REGIONAL OFFICE: THE HEART OF THE SYSTEM, THE ROOT OF
THE PROBLEM
While it is true that the court has improved the quality of the
decisions issued by the BVA, that new quality has not as readily
been translated into better decisions at the lower levels of the
agency's administrative claims review process. It is inviting to justify
this failure by reasoning that because the VA is such a large agency,
it is very difficult to change its way of doing business and, for the
first time in the agency's history, respond to the direction of an
outside reviewing authority. But facts would indicate that a major
factor in the VA's slowness to react to the case law of the court is a
continued resistance to the concept of judicial review, be it con-
scious or unconscious. For example, as many as three years after the
court was created, the VA Director of Compensation and Pension
Service, the official who controls the regional offices (the initial level
of claim adjudication often called "VAROs"), issued a memorandum
to the VAROs which appeared to downplay the compulsory nature
of court pronouncements.
A COVA [Court of Veterans Appeals] decision which remands a
case to BVA [Board of Veterans' Appeals] does not require revision
of regulations or procedures. A COVA decision which does not es-
tablish a new legal principle or void an existing regulation does not
require nationwide attention. COVA decisions are based on facts
presented in an individual case and not on legal theory.'
1
The emergence of such a memorandum, coupled with knowledge
of other cases where the VA did not appear to respond to orders of
the court, led the court to comment that:
The decision to initiate a change ... does not come from the en-
gine room or the radio room, from the ship's purser, engineer or
doctor. On the contrary, the order to change course comes from the
top, the captain on the bridge. We find nothing presented in this
case up to and during oral argument ... which would indicate that
there was, in fact, a decision made at the top-at the Secretarial
level-to change the course of the Department of Veterans Affairs
with respect to judicial review and decisions of this Court.'2
While the VA now has recognized the need to change its attitude
41. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANs AFFAIRS, MEMORANDUM FROM DIRECTOR OF COMPEN-
SATION AND PENSION SERVICE (1991).
42. Jones v. Derwinski, 1 Vet App. 596, 601 (1991).
1994]
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with respect to the authority and general applicability of court deci-
sions, the change is still slow in coming. Some evidence of the
change can be seen in the statistics regarding actions taken on ap-
peals by the BVA. For the fiscal years 1977 to 1989, the Board, on
average, overturned decisions of the VA regional offices 29.5% of the
time due to improper adjudication at that level."8 In 1990 the rever-
sal rate was 36.9%, in 1991 it was 43.5%, in 1992 it was 66.2%, and
in 1993 60.9%.44 This means that currently, the BVA is finding that
in over half of the cases decided by the regional offices and appealed
to the Board, the veteran has been denied some, non-harmless due
process right. These cases are then sent back to the regional office
with instructions to comply with the applicable statute, regulation
or court decision.
BVA Review of VARO Decisions
Remands, Allowances & Total Reversals
First Decision of COVA
70 December 19, 1989
60 +% of cases allOWed
50 X totai VA 
O reversais
50
& 40
30)
10
0
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Fiscal Year
43. BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS, APPEALS STATSTIcAL DATA-BOARD OF VETER-
ANS' APPEALS (1993). Thirty-one percent represents the combined total of the average
percentage of cases remanded (17.5%) and the average percentage of cases actually
granting a benefit (13.25%). This figure represents the Board's "reversal rate" of de-
cisions of the VA's administrative benefit decisions.
44. Id. Individual fiscal year figures were: percent of cases remanded: 1990.23.6%;
1991-13.8%; 1992-50.5%; 1993-44.0%; percent of cases allowing benefits: 1990-13.4%;
1991-13.8%; 1992-15.7%; 1993-16.9%.
The accompanying chart depicts the percent of BVA decisions remanding cases to
the VARO and those granting benefits. The sum of those two percentages equals the
total percentage of cases in which error was found (BVA "reversal rate").
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It follows, then, that even more than change at the top, change at
the bottom is crucial to the veteran receiving the true value of the
VJRA. There are two reasons for this. First, only about fifteen per-
cent of the claims filed at the various VAROs are appealed to the
BVA .45 Consequently, for the vast majority of veterans, there will
only be one look at their case. If the VARO is not properly equipped
to thoroughly and properly adjudicate claims, the veteran suffers.
Second, for those veterans who appeal the initial decision, sloppy
adjudication at the VARO only means that the case will come back
to the regional office to be done over, adding unnecessary time to
the adjudication of that claim and detracting from attention given
to new claims. My grandfather would have put it this way. "If there
is not time to do it right, when will there be time to do it over?"
THE COST OF DUE PROCESS: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
There is, of course, no free lunch. The veteran is paying for his or
her full measure of due process, not in dollars but in time. There is
no doubt that it takes more time to adjudicate a case if the VA is
required to obtain all existing medical records applicable to a partic-
ular claim; to actually support its conclusions with evidence that ap-
pears in the record; to make credibility findings based upon record
evidence; and to explain the rejection of medical evidence in the rec-
ord with more than a statement such as "the veteran's contentions
are not supported by accepted medical knowledge." VA officials are
quick to lay the blame of increased claim processing time on the
shoulders of the court.' 6
There is, however, some belief among veterans advocates that the
Board's delays in processing cases remanded to it by the court have
been less than genuine and in some cases self-inflicted. The basis for
this belief is partially anecdotal. For example, in a case that re-
quired only the Board's clarification of its treatment of evidence
currently in the record, the Board returned the case to the regional
office with an order to hospitalize the veteran for observation and
evaluation, despite the fact that the veteran had been hospitalized
several times at VA facilities and had numerous evaluations of the
disability in question.47 In another case, the court found that the VA
must attempt to obtain civilian medical records crucial to the vet-
45. BoARD oF VTERANs' APPEALs. APPEA STATISTICAL DATA-BoARD OF VETRANS'
APPEALS (1993).
46. Hearing Before Subcomm. on Compensation, Pension and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Veterans Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-64 (1992) (statement of
Deputy Secretary Anthony J. Principi); Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Veter-
ans Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-11, 33-41 (1992) (statement of Deputy Secretary
Anthony J. Principi).
47. Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 394, 397 (1991).
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eran's case, a task routinely performed by the regional office." De-
spite the clear necessity to send the case back to the VARO, the case
still resides at the Board, some seven months after the court's deci-
sion. In the face of such facts, the Chairman of the Board's frequent
laments of increased processing time 4 seem much like the physician
who orders unnecessary medical tests, all the while complaining that
the increased cost of health care is due to the litigation explosion.
VA statistics regarding lengthy processing time undoubtedly in-
clude claims in which the VA has voluntarily delayed adjudication
pending its own appeal of similar cases. For example, the VA halted
adjudication of some 6,000 claims pending its appeal of the court's
decision in Gardner v. Derwinski.50
Finally, the problem of the VA's inability to adjudicate claims in a
timely fashion is not a phenomenon that has suddenly arisen since
passage of the VJRA. In March of 1988, eight months before the
passage of the VJRA, the Chief Benefits Director of the VA testified
before Congress on the subject of the timeliness of VA claims adju-
dication. He said:
There are twenty-eight standards in our timeliness measurement
system. As of January 31, 1988, we were meeting an acceptable
level in only five of them. One year ago it was eleven categories,
and two years ago it was eighteen. We were meeting acceptable
levels in twelve of sixteen categories two years ago, and seven of
sixteen last year; today we are doing so only in three.
... [T]he Committee noted that internal VA statistics show an
increase in the number of cases remanded from the BVA back to
the [Department of Veterans Affairs] for further development. The
number of remands has increased [before judicial review] from ap-
proximately 15 percent of all appeals in 1978 to 21 percent by the
end of fiscal year 1987 (or 8,564 cases out of 41,296 appeals).
Such remands may be an indication of several systemwide
problems-for example, poor original claims development within
the DVA regional offices, inadequate medical examinations con-
ducted by private or VA physicians, overworked adjudications
within both DVB [Department of Veterans Benefits of the Veter-
ans Administration] and BVA, uncertainties regarding the resolu-
tion of highly complex cases like post-traumatic stress disorder or
48. Crader v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 169 (1993).
49. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Compensation, Pension and Insurance of
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of
Charles L. Cragin, Chairman, BVA) (May 6, 1993); Charles L. Cragin, Remarks at
meeting of major veterans service organizations held at the Department of Veterans
Affairs, Omar Bradley Conference Room, Washington, D.C. (February 1993).
50. Bill McAllister, VA Held Liable in Benefit Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1993,
at A27; Greg Pierce, VA's Handling of Benefits Ruled Wrong Since 1934, WAsH.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at A12.
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radiation exposure. 1
Veterans continually hear from the VA and the BVA's Chairman
about problems caused by judicial review legislation and how hard it
is to implement the changes wrought by its passage. 2 Except under
the duress of pending court sanctions,53 the veteran has seen little, if
any, "can do" spirit of implementation. Consequently, veterans con-
tinue to be skeptical of the genuineness of the VA's efforts to make
the fundamental changes necessary to give them the full benefit of
this historic statute.
Another reason for the veterans' belief that the VA continues to
resist judicial review comes from various pieces of proposed legisla-
tion, sponsored (officially or unofficially) by officials within the VA,
which would subvert the key result of judicial review, the require-
ment that the VA must, for the first time in its history, obey its own
rules. For example, legislation has been introduced which would
eliminate three-person rating boards at the regional offices and re-
place them with individual "rating officials;"' eliminate three-per-
son decisions in most cases decided by the Board of Veterans' Ap-
peals and replace them with single-member decisions;5 change the
definition of a well-grounded claim from the judicially established
standard of "plausible" 56 to one of "reasonable probability;,"17 and
lower the threshold requirements for imposing on the VA a duty to
assist the veteran in obtaining non-federal records in support of his
claim.58 However, in reaction to court decisions confirming its au-
thority to review certain pre-judicial review claims upon an allega-
tion of clear and unmistakable error," legislation has been intro-
duced that would restrict the effective date of the award of benefits
in such cases to ten years prior to an allegation of clear and unmis-
takable error.6 At present, the effective date is the date benefits
would have been awarded had the VA not made the error.0 ' Legisla-
tion has also been proposed that seeks to insulate the Chairman's
51. S. REP. No. 342, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30-31 (1988).
52. Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the VA Claims Adjudi-
cation Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans' Appeals, 46 M& L
REv. (forthcoming Mar. 1994); Charles L. Cragin, Address to the Second Annual Judi-
cial Conference of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals (October 18, 1993).
53. Jones v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 596, 605-08 (1991).
54. H.R. 3269, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1993).
55. Id. § 5; H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202, 203 (1993); S. 1445, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3, 4 (1993).
56. Murphy v. Derwinski 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990).
57. H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1993).
58. Id. § 103(b).
59. See, e.g., Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet App. 310 (1992).
60. H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1993).
61. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (1992).
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denial of a request for reconsideration from judicial review"2 and, in
an effort to foreclose judicial review, reduce the time limits for cer-
tain filings in the administrative process from the current one year 2
to 120 days.8 Finally, in light of the court's insistence that hearing
testimony be considered evidence, not merely contentions, pro-
posed legislation aims to limit the number of BVA travel board
hearings to 1000 per year.6
From the veteran's perspective, it can be put this way: now that
the VA is forced to play by the rules, it wants to change them. Con-
sequently, it appears that the veteran's battle for effective judicial
review of VA decisions is not over; it has just moved to a new phase:
consolidation and preparation for a VA counterattack in both the
legislative and regulatory theaters.
REQUIRING THE VA TO FOLLOW THE RULES WHEN MAKING THE
RULES
Veterans organizations have recognized a need for judicial super-
vision of the VA's formulation and interpretation of its own rules.
The court has also recognized this need. In Fugere v. Derwinski0 7
the court gave teeth to the portion of the VJRA which subjects the
VA rule-making process to the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.6 8 In Fugere the court held that certain sections of
the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, 9 a manual commonly
treated by the VA as an internal, interpretive set of procedures,
were VA policies that affected individual rights which could not be
rescinded without compliance with the notice and comment provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The facts of Fugere provide a good basis for understanding the
importance veterans place on judicial review of rule-making deci-
sions. In 1987, the VA published new, more restrictive rating criteria
for, among other things, hearing disabilities. Despite these new cri-
teria, however, veterans were protected against a decrease in bene-
fits if there had not been any change in the veteran's condition or
62. H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1993).
63. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b)(1) (West 1991).
64. H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 205, 206 (1993).
65. Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164, 169-70 (1991).
66. H.R. 2574, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1993). The current statute (38
U.S.C.A. § 7110 (West 1991)) gives the veteran an absolute right to a hearing by a
traveling section of the Board, placing no restriction on the number of such hearings
that may be conducted in one year. Recent statistics show that the Board conducted
3,533 hearings at VAROs during fiscal year 1993. Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of
Judicial Review on the VA Claims Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the
Board of Veterans Appeals, 46 ME. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1994).
67. 1 Vet. App. 103 (1990), aff'd 972 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
68. 38 U.S.C. §§ 501(d), 502 (Supp. III 1991).
69. DEPARTmENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL.
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disability. The VA Adjudication Manual (the Department's instruc-
tions to its claims adjudicators) specifically provided that if a vet-
eran's claim had been previously adjudicated and a change in rating
criteria or the adoption of new testing procedures (rather than an
actual change in the veteran's condition) would result in a reduced
benefit for the veteran, the adjudicatqr should apply the old, more
favorable criteria in conducting a new rating. In 1988, without no-
tice, the VA rescinded this protective manual provision. Mr. Fugere,
who had an adjudicated hearing disability, asked that his disability
be reevaluated. When the readjudication occurred, in the absence of
the recently rescinded manual provision, the new rating criteria
were applied, and the VA reduced Mr. Fugere's disability benefit.
7 0
The court held that the VA must follow the notice and comment
procedure required by the Administrative Procedure Act before re-
scinding this rule. Since the VA failed to do so, the court struck
down the VA's attempted revision of the protective provision of the
Adjudication Procedure Manual and restored the benefit lost by Mr.
Fugere.7 1
In another case, the court discussed the degree of deference VA
rules should be given when the interpretation of a veterans' benefits
statute is at issue. In Gardner v. Brown, 2 a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit unanimously upheld
the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals which had found that
the sixty-year-old VA regulation governing the payment of claims
for persons who suffer an additional disability as a result of VA
medical treatment was invalid. The court found that the VA had, by
its regulation, imposed eligibility requirements not contained in the
legislation authorizing this benefit and was therefore invalid.7
In defense of its regulation, the VA argued to the court that inval-
idation of the regulation would have dire financial consequences for
the VA-an argument that must have caused veterans who had long
sought judicial review to nod knowingly at the admission of a prac-
tice they had long suspected.74 Needless to say, the court dismissed
this argument by stating that the expense of providing the benefit
70. Fugere v. Derwinsti, 1 Vet. App. at 104-05.
71. Id.
72. 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1463-64.
74. [D]uring periods of fiscal restraint, regulations can be shaped more
through the influence of the Office of Management and Budget and blatant
political pressure than the intent of Congress. Most often it is these deci-
sions which deny benefits to veterans otherwise eligible under the law, ei-
ther by direct constriction of the regulation, or by the outright denial of
adequate funding levels for authorized programs.
H. REP. No. 60, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1988) (statement of Gordon H. Mansfield,
Associate Executive Director for Government Relations, Paralyzed Veterans of
America, testifying in support of judicial review legislation).
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authorized by legislation is Congress' concern."
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Federal Circuit's opin-
ion was its treatment of the VA's argument that the court should
give special deference to the VA's interpretation of the statute be-
cause the VA regulation or its equivalent was long-standing. While
recognizing that the VA's regulation had been in existence in some
form for nearly sixty years, the court found this fact of little signifi-
cance. The court indicated that deference was inappropriate in light
of the fact that until the passage of the Veterans' Judicial Review
Act in 1988, the regulation was not subject to judicial review. The
court dismissed the VA's argument noting that until the VJRA,
"[m]any VA regulations have aged nicely simply because Congress
took so long to provide for judicial review.""
The VA has estimated that the Gardner decision, when imple-
mented, will have immediate affect on some 6,000 veterans." Again,
this is clear testimony to the value of judicial review to veterans.
INDEPENDENCE PRESUMES ETERNAL VIGILANCE
In considering whether or not to institute additional appeal rights
for veterans, Congress considered two models. One would have
caused a review of veterans' claims by currently existing Article III
courts.7 Congress opted, however, to establish a specialized court
under Article I of the Constitution with jurisdiction limited to the
review of decisions of the BVA.7 9 A primary reason to have judicial
review is to have a body apart from and independent of the VA re-
view its decisions on claims for veterans benefits. This independence
is important both in practice and in perception.
The value of the court to veterans and, indeed, the court's ability
to fulfill the function for which it was created, depends upon the
ability to maintain its independence. This may not be easy to do for
a court of such limited jurisdiction. Without vigilance, it may be
easy for the court to treat cases as one of a particular type, rather
than reviewing with searching inquiry whether the claims presented
by the veteran merit consideration, if not redress.
To maintain its independent status both in fact and in the eyes of
the public, the court should avoid continued use of VA euphemisms
such as "buddy statements"80 for statements, often sworn, of wit-
75. Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d at 1464.
76. Id. at 1462.
77. Bill McAllister, VA Held Liable in Benefit Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1993,
at A27; Greg Pierce, VA's Handling of Benefits Ruled Wrong Since 1934, WASH.
TI'mEs, Sept. 16, 1993, at A12.
78. See, e.g., H.R. 639, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); S. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
79. 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (1991).
80. Burger v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 340, 342 (1993); Thibault v. Brown, No. 92-885
(Vet. App. Sept. 15, 1993).
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nesses provided by persons who knew the veteran. Use of such lan-
guage suggests a lack of sufficient independent inquiry. The court
itself has cautioned the VA to consider such statements as evidence
and accord them appropriate weight in light of other information in
the record.
Ex PARTE AND ADVERSARY ADJUDICATION
A CALL FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
The VA claims adjudication system has always been built upon a
philosophy of benign paternalism. When practiced fairly, this phi-
losophy has served the veteran well over the years. When reviewing
the testimony of various veterans groups, one is struck with the con-
cern, almost a fear, that judicial review would supplant this philoso-
phy with unnecessary formalization of the claims process. Indeed,
the VA seemed to play on this fear when in June of 1988, the VA
responded to a number of specific questions posed by the Senate
Veterans Affairs Committee then considering judicial review legisla-
tion."" The Senate Committee asked the VA to respond to these
questions:
For each of the following procedures, please state the reasons why
the VA does not currently practice the particular procedure in
question, and believes the procedure would have a negative effect
on the process of reaching an equitable, fair decision for the
claimant:
A. Developing evidence to refute a claimant's contentions in or-
der to ensure that the record supports denial of an unmer-
itorious claim. 8
The VA responded:
It is wise to recall that the VA adjudication process is ex parte in
nature. Evidence is secured on behalf of a claimant, not in spite of
or in contradiction to a claimant. It is the practice of the Agency
not to refute contentions which will not support an allowance of
the benefit sought. Very often a veteran makes a variety of conten-
tions which may or may not be wholly supported by the record.
However, acceptance of these arguments may not provide a basis
for favorable action. Because of the non-adversarial philosophy of
the Agency, we will not refute these assertions. In other instances,
the documentary evidence is at variance with the allegations. This
evidence is in the form of hospital reports, medical examinations
and other contemporaneous evidence filed in the claims folder. The
adjudicators may conclude it is sufficient to answer the contentions
81. Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing Before the Committee on Veterans Af-
fairs of the U.S. Senate on S. 11, The Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudica-
tion and Judicial Review Act and S. 2292, Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 640-55 (1988) (written response of the Veterans Administration).
82. Id. at 646.
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and deny the claim or appeal. It is not a practice to obtain the
actual office records or complete hospital records folder or investi-
gate the situation in order to refute all contentions. On the other
hand, when the adjudicators are of the opinion that the evidence is
insufficient to allow the claim or to refute the contentions, they will
develop the evidence in order to afford the veteran every opportu-
nity for allowance. 8
The Committee further asked the VA why it did not "[d]evelop[]
and produc[e] evidence, such as consultative opinions and scientific
treatises or journal articles to support the medical judgment of the
VA's medical adjudicators. .... ,,84 The VA responded:
The rating boards and Board of Veterans Appeals rely upon ac-
cepted and sound medical principles in reviewing factual issues.
Moreover, they access established and well-known medical refer-
ence works, and the adjudicative panels in medical cases include a
member who is trained in general medicine or a specialty particu-
larly relevant to veterans' disabilities. In addition, the veteran is
free to submit consultative opinions, scientific treatises, or journal
articles for review. If the content of these opinions presents a medi-
cal issue or controversy, the evidence of record along with the opin-
ions submitted by the veteran will be submitted to an independent
medical expert for review and an opinion. That individual will be
familiar with the professional literature relating to the particular
medical issue and present an opinion as it relates to the evidence of
record. Moreover, the veteran is permitted to review and comment
on that opinion before a decision is rendered. The current system
works well and provides a full review of a point of medical contro-
versy to ensure a fair decision. To expand this to require develop-
ment of medical literature to refute opinions beyond those situa-
tions described above would encumber the system without any
resulting tangible benefit to claimants. There are many medical
contentions presented in claims and appeals that are not supported
by accepted medical principles and are not supported or verified by
clinical findings. To require intensive documentation with litera-
ture to refute these contentions would serve no useful purpose.85
The Committee also asked the VA why it did not, during personal
hearings, "[ask] direct, probing questions of witnesses to ascertain
and evaluate the credibility of the evidence they present so as to
articulate why their testimony is found to be 'less than persua-
sive.' "88 The VA responded by stating:
The type of conduct in examining witnesses acceptable in court-
rooms would be inappropriate at a VA hearing. Hearings before the
VA are not formal, judicial proceedings. The hearing is held for the
83. Id. at 647.
84. Id. at 646.
85. Id. at 648-49.
86. Id. at 649.
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benefit of the claimant, and is but one aspect of the VA's mandate
to assist the claimant in developing his or her claim. Efforts must
be made to ensure that the claimant does not receive the impres-
sion that a final decision on the claim or appeal has been reached
prior to holding the hearing, or that the Agency is his or her adver-
sary. For example, under present regulations cross-examination is
to be avoided. 7
Consequently, there is a fine line drawn at VA hearings between
questioning a witness to ensure the substance or veracity of evi-
dence and maintaining the nonadversarial atmosphere of the pro-
ceeding. We are concerned that judicial second-guessing of VA de-
cisions and increased participation of attorneys as veterans'
representatives would insinuate a more adversarial influence into
VA proceedings that may confuse and threaten witnesses, discour-
age personal hearings, and deprive our adjudicators of valuable in-
formation that could aid the veteran's claim.88
These responses indicated that the VA believes that the require-
ments to gather and weigh evidence, to make evaluations of credibil-
ity, and to explain to veterans the reasons for its decisions make the
whole adjudication system adversarial. Not only is this not neces-
sary, it was clearly not intended by Congress when it passed the
VJRA.
As the Chairman of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs
stated in his comments on the House floor regarding the VJRA
[W]e have crafted a compromise bill which will allow an indepen-
dent review by a court of the VA's decision on a veteran's claim,
will allow judicial review of VA regulations and legal interpreta-
tions, and will allow veterans to pay attorneys to represent them
before the court. At the same time, we think we have preserved as
much of the informal and generous nature of the existing system as
possible .... 19
In providing for judicial review of veterans claims, it is not our
intent to encourage litigation between veterans and the VA .. 0
All that the VJRA has done is ensure that the VA obtain all of
the necessary facts upon which to make a decision, to allow testimo-
nial evidence, given under oath, the weight normally accorded such
evidence, to apply the favorable statutory presumptions and stan-
87. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.157(c) (1992).
88. Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing Before the Committee on Veterans Af-
fairs of the U.S. Senate on S. 11, The Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudica-
tion and Judicial Review Act and S. 2292, Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 649 (1988) (written response of the Veterans Administration). This
testimony is another example of the VA's pre-judicial review adjudication practices,
discussed earlier, which the court later found to be unacceptable violations of the law
and agency regulation.
89. 134 CONG. REc. H10,342 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Montgomery).
90. Id. at H10,343.
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dards of proof when weighing evidence and, most importantly, to
explain the decision upon a request from the veteran. Nothing in
this process requires the VA to treat the veteran as an adversary
during the administrative adjudication of the claim.
In an adversary proceeding, the two sides start the process with
opposing views of the facts to be decided, then each side presents
proof to support its position, thus permitting a neutral fact finder to
decide which position is correct. Consequently, if the VA's view, that
judicial review makes claims adjudication adversarial, was adopted,
when a veteran filed a claim, the VA would assume that the claim
was invalid and begin to gather evidence to refute it. But this is not
what the law commands. As discussed above, if the facts presented
are plausible, the VA must assume that the claim is valid and pro-
ceed to assist the veteran in gathering the necessary evidentiary sup-
port to permit payment of the claim. If, after all attempts to locate
potentially available evidence have been exhausted, the VA believes
there is insufficient evidence to warrant granting the benefit sought,
then it must deny the claim and be prepared, if asked by the vet-
eran, to explain why it was denied and what additional evidence, if
available, would substantiate the claim. There is nothing adversarial
in this process. The situation changes, however, when the veteran
appeals to the Court of Veterans Appeals. There, the VA properly
defends the agency's decision as a partisan advocate. The VA must
understand precisely when this change in roles occurs.
From the veteran's viewpoint, the post-VJRA administrative adju-
dication system can still be "paternalistic." The VA, however, can
no longer be the parent who justifies his decisions with the
equivalent of the simple statement, "Because I'm your father, and I
say so." The parent who supports his or her decisions with the force
of fact and logic, is no less the parent, has no less authority, and is
not somehow transformed into an opponent of the child.
Instead of decrying the "fundamental changes" in the VA system
supposedly wrought by the VJRA, VA officials should emphasize
that judicial review merely means that the VA must do what it has
long been charged with doing, only it must do it better. Past abuses
in the system, both real and perceived, necessitate improvement in
the quality of adjudication. However, it does a great disservice to
the veteran, and truly subverts the purposes of the judicial review
legislation, to imply that the adjudication of veterans claims is to be
done on an adversarial basis.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
By and large, veterans should be happy with the direction things
have taken since the inception of judicial review. There is, however,
more that needs to be done. First, the door to judicial review must
be opened wider. Judicial review must not be limited only to veter-
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ans who have filed a Notice of Disagreement 1 on or after November
18, 1988.92 The effect of various court decisions has left only two
means for a veteran with a "finally" denied claim to have it reviewed
under the new adjudication system. A new review can be obtained
either by presenting "new and material evidence" or by establishing
that the VA committed "clear and unmistakable error" in its prior
adjudication." This is unfair to many veterans.
For example, prior to the VJRA, the VA and BVA denied the
claims of many veterans based on nothing more than their own un-
substantiated medical conclusions. The court, however, considers
the VA's pre-judicial review act adjudications as "final adjudica-
tions" and requires a veteran to file new and material evidence to
reopen previously denied claims. This is especially unfair when the
record shows that the veteran has filed medical evidence throughout
the years which, because of the absence of judicial review, the VA
and BVA could (and did) simply ignore. It is even more unfair when
the VA and BVA denied the claim without any independent medical
evidence on the record to support their denial decisions.
An example of this injustice is presented by the facts of Spencer
v. Brown.94 In Spencer, the record before the court showed that the
veteran, prior to the removal of the statutory bar to judicial review,
received no less than four BVA decisions. After the removal of the
bar he received yet another BVA decision, which the court affirmed
on appeal. The record also showed that the veteran had filed private
medical opinions with the VA as proof that he developed multiple
sclerosis while serving on active duty and, as a result, was entitled to
receive compensation and medical treatment for his disability. The
VA and BVA never substantively addressed Mr. Spencer's medical
evidence, nor did the VA or BVA obtain a medical opinion contrary
to the medical opinions filed by Mr. Spencer. Even though the VA
and BVA relied upon no independent medical evidence of record to
support their decisions denying Mr. Spencer's claim, the court af-
firmed the BVA decision. In so doing, the court found that the VA
had finally disposed of Mr. Spencer's claim prior to the advent of
judicial review, and that if the veteran wanted full judicial review of
the manner in which his claim was adjudicated, he had to reopen his
claim by filing new and material evidence. This is so even though,
today, under the court's opinions, the VA's failure to rely on inde-
pendent medical evidence would constitute reversible legal error re-
91. A Notice of Disagreement is "[a] written communication ... expressing dis-
satisfaction or disagreement with an adjudicative determination by the agency of
original jurisdiction ... ." 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1992).
92. 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (Supp. I1 1991) (Chapter Applicable to Cases Filed on or
After November 18, 1988).
93. Id. §§ 5108, 7104(b) (Supp. I1 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (1992).
94. 4 Vet. App. 283 (1993).
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quiring de novo readjudication of the claim. Having submitted sub-
stantial independent medical evidence in the past, it is impossible
for Mr. Spencer to submit any further evidence that would meet the
court's definition of "new and material."
Second, there is a need for more trained advocates, knowledgeable
in the law of veterans' benefits. Many of the court's precedential
opinions have been issued with the veteran appearing pro seY Cur-
rent statistics show that more than eighty percent of veterans filing
appeals to the court have no representative. Without trained advo-
cates, knowledgeable in the legal issues, the court has had little help
developing a unified body of law.
The adversary model of dispute resolution depends for success on
two relatively equally matched parties arguing their points with full
force. The VA is fully represented in every case. It has the opportu-
nity to ensure that the court hears its side of the case articulated by
trained advocates. However, veterans are represented in only twenty
percent of the cases. This puts a strain on the proper functioning of
this judicial model.
The court, to its credit, has attempted to deal with this problem.
Its Central Legal Staff and the judges' law clerks review cases filed
by pro se veterans and attempt to spot key issues for the judges. In
appropriate cases, outside counsel are sought to argue particularly
important or complex legal issues before the court." The court also
invites the filing of amicus curiae briefs by persons and organiza-
tions regularly practicing before the court.97 The court has also
made nearly a million dollars in grants available for demonstration
projects to establish a system for volunteer attorneys to handle cases
pro bono for financially qualifying, pro se veterans.98 That program
placed over 230 cases with attorney representatives during its first
year of operation.9 But despite these efforts, the danger of operat-
ing an adversarial system with one of the parties fighting with at
least one arm tied behind his or her back has dangerous implications
95. Reonal v. Brown, 1993 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 458, No. 91-2014 (Sept. 8, 1993)
(a physician's opinion is not new and material where it is based'on a medical history
previously rejected by VA); King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993) (statutory re-
quirement that the veteran submit well-grounded claim performs the functions of
requirement of showing entitlement to relief under the federal rules of civil proce-
dure); Ross v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 141, 144-45 (1992) (a claim based on improper
VA medical treatment is not well-grounded where not accompanied by supporting
evidence); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992) (a lay person's opin-
ion on a medical question does not constitute new and material evidence sufficient to
reopen a claim because the lay person is not competent to express a medical opinion).
96. See, e.g., Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 584 (1991).
97. See, e.g., Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 231 (1992), Gardner v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 584 (1991); Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3 (1990).
98. Minutes of the Advisory Committee of the Veterans Consortium (Nov. 16,
1993).
99. Id.
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for the jurisprudence of the law of veterans' benefits.
Another question that may receive consideration in the future is
whether the court should hear class action suits as a possible mecha-
nism to compel correction of a systemic error. Without class actions,
changes in the law that affect large groups of veterans will have to
be made on a case-by-case basis. For example, in cases of veterans
who had their disability ratings reduced under facts similar to those
recounted in Fugere, the VA is under no duty to identify those vet-
erans and make them whole. It is, rather, up to the individual vet-
eran to discover the court's precedent and ask for a readjudication
of his or her case based upon that decision and a claim of clear and
unmistakable error. If, however, the law permitted class actions, a
mechanism would exist to identify potential members of the class
and, if the suit were successful, the VA could be required to give all
class members relief.
In the consolidated cases of Harrison v. Derwinski'00 and Lefko-
witz v. Derwinski,101 the court found it did not have the authority to
hear class actions. To be sure, there are downsides to class actions.
But, if the VA does not seek on its own to correct systemic errors
identified in certain court decisions, it could find itself faced with
legislative efforts to permit the court to hear complaints of classes of
veterans.
AFTERWORD
In summary, I would like to say that I believe the creation of the
Court of Veterans Appeals has begun the restoration of integrity to
the adjudication of claims for veterans' benefits. It is true that the
court is forcing the VA to change, but the changes have, in the main,
been beneficial to veterans. If the VA accepts the fact that the court
is here to stay and works assiduously to align its adjudication ma-
chinery with the dictates of the law, case processing time will be
reduced and the quality of claims adjudication will be vastly im-
proved. To accomplish this, the VA must have sufficient resources to
.properly develop and adjudicate cases focusing first on the place
where the most important adjudication activities occur, the regional
offices.
The iubject of judicial review naturally focuses attention on the
cases that went wrong. Judicial review is working to improve the
quality of review that every veteran receives when he or she files a
claim for benefits. To this end, a focus on what can go wrong is im-
portant and valuable. But no veteran should lose sight of the fact
that a lot goes right in VA adjudication. This past year there were
over 440,000 new claims filed with the VA for disability compensa-
100. 1 Vet. App. 438 (1991).
101. 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991).
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tion or pension benefits. 102 Veterans expressed their dissatisfaction
with these adjudications by filing a Notice of Disagreement in only
about fifteen percent of these cases.
Both veterans and the VA must strive to make the system the
best it can be. Judicial review gives the veteran a meaningful voice
in that process. To the extent the veteran's side is taken by the
court, the VA should view this as a positive step toward ensuring its
decisions are both fair and thorough. When the veteran loses, he can
be sure that the decision is one that comports with the law and has
a basis in fact. In the larger sense, both sides win.
The biggest challenge to both sides is to keep the adversary pro-
cess where it belongs-in the court. If the VA persists in transform-
ing its claims processing at the BVA and the regional offices into an
adversary proceeding, its prophecy of intolerable processing delays
and antagonism will be self-fulfilling. The Department of Veterans
Affairs must never forget its charge to care for those who have borne
the battle, their widows, and their orphans.
102. BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS, APPEAL STATISTICAL DATA-BOARD OF VETER-
ANS' APPEALs (1993).
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